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COMMENT 
CUSTOMIZING THE REASONABLE-
WOMAN STANDARD TO FIT 
EMOTIONALLY AND 
FINANCIALLY DISABLED 
PLAINTIFFS IS OUTSIDE THE 
SCOPE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT'S PROHIBITION ON SEX-
BASED DISCRIMINATION: 
HOLLY D. V. CALIFORNIA 
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
Workplace sexual harassment is a developing area of fed-
erallaw. 1 As federal courts define the contours of sexual har-
1 Changes to the standard of employer liability for supervisor harassment in 
1998 have made it necessary for lower federal courts to reconsider many aspects of 
federal sexual harassment law. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 
(1998) (held that employers are strictly vicariously liable for supervisor harassment, 
however, employer may invoke an affirmative reasonable-care defense if the plaintiff 
has not suffered a tangible employment action). See also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding on 
liability lower federal courts have had to decide whether coerced submission and con-
structive discharge are tangible employment actions. Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 
F.3d 84,94 (2nd Cir. 2002) (holding that coerced submission is a tangible employment 
action); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
coerced submission is a tangible employment action); but see Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 
278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (submission to a quid pro quo threat is not 
tangible employment action harassment); see Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3rd. 
127 
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assment, it is important that these courts shape the law in a 
way that furthers the purposes behind Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act.2 Recently, the Ninth Circuit decided a novel issue 
in sexual harassment law.3 In Holly D. v. California Institute 
of Technology, the plaintiff alleged that she engaged in sexual 
relations with her supervisor in order to retain her position 
with the California Institute of Technology.4 The Ninth Circuit 
held that employers are strictly vicariously liable when a su-
pervisor threatens job-related consequences, such as termina-
tion or demotion, to coerce a subordinate into sexual relations.5 
The threat can be implicit or explicit.6 To find an implicit 
threat in the Ninth Circuit, courts look for a nexus between the 
supervisor's sexual advances and the supervisor's exercise of 
authority over the employee alleging that she was harassed.7 
When the threat is implicit, the plaintiff must show that a rea-
sonable woman in her position would have believed that her 
continued employment depended upon submitting to her su-
pervisor sexually.8 In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit suggested 
that it might consider an employee's emotional and financial 
disabilities in a case in which the employee alleges that her 
supervisor used implicit threats to coerce her into a sexual re-
Cir. 2003} (constructive discharge is a tangible employment action). For a more exten-
sive discussion of the development of federal anti-sexual harassment law, see infra 
notes 21-143 and accompanying text. 
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. A § 2000e-I-17 (West 2004); 
see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-6 (1998) (the policies behind Title 
VII are reflected in the Court's creation of the reasonable-care defense. The Court's 
attention to these policies when shaping the law indicates that while sexual harass-
ment law is not directly addressed by Title VII, the development of federal anti-
harassment law under this Act should remain consistent with the purposes behind the 
Civil Rights Act). 
3 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003). 
4 [d. at 1161-62. 
5 [d. at 1162. 
6 [d. at 1173. 
7 E.g. Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1994). 
8 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2003). Cur-
rently, the Ninth Circuit uses a reasonable-woman standard in sexual harassment 
cases when the plaintiff is female and a reasonable man standard when the plaintiff is 
a male. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,879 & n.11 (9th Cir. 1991). But see Nichols v. 
Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 1994) (listing other traits that the Ninth Circuit 
might incorporate into the reasonable woman standard, such as "race, age, physical or 
mental disability, and sexual orientation"); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 
1527 (9th Cir. 1995) ("hostile work environment" must be determined from the perspec-
tive of a reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics)." 
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lationship.9 Holly D., however, did not argue that her emo-
tional and financial disabilities should have been considered by 
the court.lO Consequently, the Ninth Circuit applied the rea-
sonable-woman standard, merely noting that these disabilities 
might have a legal effect if raised in a later case. l1 This Com-
ment suggests that the Ninth Circuit should not customize the 
reasonable-woman standard to include a plaintiffs emotional 
and financial disabilities. 
Tailoring the reasonable-woman standard to include select 
disabilities is problematic because employer liability would im-
properly depend upon the effect that the victim's disability had 
on the victim's perception, instead of on the agency relationship 
between the supervisor and the employer. 12 Furthermore, 
these subjective standards would prevent employers from suc-
cessfully invoking the reasonable care defenseY Using these 
tailored standards would also result in discriminatory treat-
ment under the law for women who did not qualify for one of 
these customized standardsY Finally, customized standards 
9 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Holly 
D. did not ... argue that a different standard of "reasonableness" should be applied to 
her than to the average woman who held the type of job she held. Finally, she did not 
present argument or evidence as to what any different standard should be in the case 
of women in financial or psychological difficulty. Under these circumstances, we do not 
address the issue of whether the supervisor's conduct as alleged here could constitute a 
tangible employment action in the case of a woman who alleges that her responses 
must be viewed not from the standpoint of an average reasonable-woman but from that 
of a reasonable woman suffering from serious financial and emotional disabilities. We 
reserve that issue for an appropriate case)." [d. This Comment focuses solely on sex-
ual harassment by a supervisory employee against a subordinate as sexual harassment 
by a supervisor carries strict liability for the plaintiff's employer under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) ("employer 
is vicariously liable for actionable [sexual harassment] caused by a supervisor"); Bur-
lington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (employer is vicariously liable 
for hostile work environment sexual harassment caused by a supervisor). 
10 Holly D. V. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). 
11 [d. The reasonable-woman standard is a legal construct created to evaluate an 
alleged harasser's conduct. See Ellison V. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-81 (9th Cir. 1991). 
A female plaintiff must demonstrate to the factfinder that a reasonable woman would 
have found the defendant's misconduct severe enough to alter the victim's working 
conditions. [d at 879. This standard is used in hostile work environment sexual har-
assment cases and in tangible employment action cases involving an implicit threat. 
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (hostile work environment claim 
standard is reasonable-woman); Holly D. V. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (the existence of an implicit quid pro quo in a tangible employment action 
claim threat is determined through a reasonable-woman standard). 
12 See infra notes 153-165 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra note 166-168 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text. 
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would sterilize American workplaces. 15 In support of this 
Comment's assertions against factoring the emotional and fi-
nancial difficulties of the actual plaintiff into the reasonable-
woman standard, Part I provides a background of federal sex-
ual harassment law, ending with a review of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's recent decision in Holly D. v. California Institute of Tech-
nology.16 Part II (a) discusses how customized standards would 
enlarge the scope of employer liability, conflicting with the 
principles of agency law that justify holding employers strictly 
vicariously liable for supervisor harassment and decreasing 
employers' abilities to use the reasonable care defense.17 Part 
II (b) suggests that customized reasonable-woman standards 
create unequal treatment for women under the law, a contra-
vention of anti-discrimination laws.1s Part II (c) proposes that 
customized standards would strike a death blow to workplace 
romances because supervisors and employers would fear that 
innocent relationships might lead to sanctions.19 Part III con-
cludes that customized reasonable-woman standards cause a 
number of problems that can be best avoided by leaving these 
standards buried in a Holly D. v. California Institute of Tech-
nology footnote. 2o 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. SEXUAL HARAsSMENT VIOLATES TITLE VII's PROHIBITION 
ON SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (hereinafter, Title VII) 
prohibits employers from making employment decisions be-
cause of the sex of the employee (or applicant) or from dis-
criminating against an employee in the "compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment" because of that em-
ployee's sex.21 Conservative legislators added sex as a last 
minute attempt to kill the Civil Rights Act.22 Those legislators' 
15 See infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 21-143 and accompanying text. 
17 See supra notes 12 and 13. 
18 See supra note 14. 
19 See supra note 15. 
20 See infra notes 201-204 and accompanying text. 
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000-e-2 (a)(1) (West 2004). 
22 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,63 (1986). 
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plans backfired, and the bill passed as amended.23 Since sex 
was a last minute addition, there is little legislative history to 
indicate Congress's intentions in banning sexual discrimina-
tion.24 As a result, gender discrimination under Title VII has 
developed through case law and agency guidelines.25 
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(hereinafter, "EEOC"), chartered by Congress to enforce the 
Civil Rights Act, recognized sexual harassment as a violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.26 The EEOC issues adminis-
trative guidelines entitled, "Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause Of Sex" that provide the public with the EEOC's stance 
on statutory compliance.27 These guidelines cover a spectrum 
of sexual harassment issues, from defining harassment that 
violates Title VII to advising employers on how to eliminate 
sexual harassment through preventive measures.28 According 
to the EEOC guidelines, sexual harassment violates Title VII 
when the harasser explicitly or implicitly conditions the vic-
tim's continued employment on the victim's willingness to 
submit to unwanted sexual advances, requests for sexual rela-
tions, or other verbal or physical acts of a sexual nature.29 
Courts commonly refer to this type of harassment as quid pro 
quo harassment.3o Title VII also prohibits harassing conduct 
23 Id.at 64. 
24 Id. 
25 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the federal agency respon-
sible for enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(g) (West 
2004); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986). 
26 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a 5 member board em-
powered to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(a) (West 
2004); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(a) (West 2004). See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 
65 (1986) (acknowledging that the EEOC determined that sexual harassment was a 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1980); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2004) 
(originally issued in 1980). 
27 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2004). 
28 29 C.F.R. § 1604. l1(a)-(g) (2004). 
29 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a)(1)-(2) (2004). 
30 For examples of this terminology, see Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 65 (1986); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1998); 
Gorski v. N.H. Dep't ofCorr., 290 F.3d 466, 472 (1st Cir. 2002); Leibovitz v. New York 
City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 188 (2nd Cir. 2001); Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 
441 (3rd. Cir. 2003); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 186 (4th Cir. 2001); 
Ackel v. Nat'l Communications., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2003); Akers v. 
Alvey, 338 F.3d 491,500 (6th Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317,324-25 
(7th Cir. 2003); Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721, 735 (8th Cir. 2000); 
Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th Cir. 2002); Pipkins v. City of Temple 
Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 2001); Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1124 
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that has the effect of unreasonably interfering with the victim's 
work environment.31 Courts commonly refer to this type of 
harassment as "hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment."32 
Sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII first came be-
fore the U.S. Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son.33 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson held that "hostile work 
environment sexual harassment" was a form of sex discrimina-
tion that violated Title VII. 34 Furthermore, an employer is not 
automatically liable for a supervisor's harassing behavior.35 
Instead, federal courts should look to the principles of agency 
law to determine when an employer is liable for its supervisor's 
misconduct.36 For twelve years, the U.S. Supreme Court al-
lowed the lower federal courts to determine employer liability 
(D.C. Cir. 2002). But see Holly D. v. Cal. !nst. of Tech., 359 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.13 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (in light of Supreme Court's changes in the liability standard the Ninth 
Circuit now distinguishes between "tangible employment action sexual harassment" 
and "hostile environment sexual harassment"). Id. "Quid pro quo" is Latin for "some-
thing for something." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1261 (7th ed. 1999). 
31 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a)(3) (2004). 
32 For examples of this terminology, see Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57,65 (1986); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-753 (1998); 
Gorski v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 472 (1st Cir. 2002); Leibovitz v. New York 
City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 188 (2nd Cir. 2001); Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 
441 (3rd. Cir. 2003); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 186 (4th Cir. 2001); 
Ackel v. Nat'l Communications., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2003); Akers v. 
Alvey, 338 F.3d 491,500 (6th Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 324-
325 (7th Cir. 2003); Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721, 735 (8th Cir. 2000); 
Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th Cir. 2002); Pipkins v. City of Temple 
Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 2001); Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1124 
(D.C. Cir. 2002). Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 359 F.3d 1158, 1167 n. 13 (9th Cir. 
2003). "Hostile work environment," "hostile work environment harassment," and "hos-
tile work environment sexual harassment" will be used interchangeably throughout 
this Comment. 
33 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (1986). 
34 Id.at 64-66. Meritor did not directly decided whether quid pro quo harassment 
violated Title VII; however, the court's adoption of the EEOC's guidelines strongly 
indicates that the Court agreed that both quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
harassment violated Title VII. See id.at 65-67. The court supported its holding with 
two arguments. Id. First, the court found that the inclusion of the words "terms, con-
ditions or privileges of employment [in the 42 U.S.C. 2000e] evince [d] a congressional 
intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in 
employment." Id. at 64 (internal quotations omitted). Second, the court adopted the 
EEOC conclusions, based upon racial harassment case law, that a hostile work envi-
ronment which affected an employee's ability to perform her job or that was abusive, 
offensive, or intimidating violated Title VII by changing the terms and conditions of the 
affected individual's employment. Id. at 65-66. 
35 Id. at 72-73. 
36 Id. at 73. 
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for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor.37 During 
this time, "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" sex-
ual harassment carried different types of liability.3s Employer 
liability for "quid pro quo harassment" carried vicarious liabil-
ity, and liability for "hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment" varied.39 
B. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY A 
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEE: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
HOLDS EMPLOYERS STRICTLY VICARIOUSLY LIABLE 
Twelve years after the U.S. Supreme Court announced its 
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court again 
considered the issue of employer liability when a supervisor 
sexually harasses a subordinate.4o Burlington Industries, Inc. 
v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, companion cases 
handed down on the same day, held that an employer is strictly 
liable when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate.41 
The Court, however, created an affirmative reasonable-care 
defense available to employers when the supervisor's harass-
ment does not result in a "tangible employment action," such as 
firing, demoting, or failing to promote.42 
37 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 780 (1998); see also Burling-
ton Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,746-47 (1998). 
38 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,788-91 (1998) (discussing the 
different standards used by district courts for "quid pro quo" and "hostile work envi-
ronment" sexual harassment); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-53 
(1998) (discussing the fact that lower federal courts used a vicarious liability standard 
for "quid pro quo sexual harassment." 
39 See supra note 38. 
40 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998). 
41 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
42 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). A tangible employment action is an employ-
ment decision that significantly alters the terms or conditions of an employee's job. 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Examples given by the 
Court include hiring, firing, and failing to promote an employee. [d. 
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The affirmative reasonable-care defense consists of two 
prongs.43 First, the employer must demonstrate that it made 
efforts to prevent and correct sexual harassment.44 Second, the 
employer must show that the plaintiff-employee failed to act 
reasonably to avoid harm by using the employer's complaint 
procedures or through other means.45 If the employer meets 
the two prong test, then the employer is not liable for action-
able sexual harassment.46 
C. STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY LAw 
Title VII imposes liability on the employer, not on the ha-
rasser.47 When a supervisor is the culprit, the employer is 
strictly liable for the injury caused by the supervisor.48 In Bur-
lington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, the U.S. Supreme Court turned to the Restatement of 
Agency Law, section 219 to determine employer liability for 
supervisor sexual harassment of a subordinate.49 An employer 
is liable for the tort of its employee committed while acting 
43 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). "The defense comprises two necessary ele-
ments: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable-care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 
807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
44 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998). 
45 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998). 
46 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
47 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003). 
48 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998). 
49 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793, 797,801-2 (1998); Burling-
ton Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,755-58 (1998). Restatement § 219(1) "A mas-
ter is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the 
scope of their employment; (2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his 
servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: (d) the servant pur-
ported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon appar-
ent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency 
relationship." [d. at 758 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency Law § 219 (1958». 
The Restatement of Agency Law is "[01 ne of several influential treatises, published by 
the American Law Institute, describing the law in a given area and guiding its devel-
opment." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1314-1315 (7th ed. 1999). Restatements are not 
binding authority. Id. 
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within the scope of employment. 50 Conversely, an employer is 
not liable if the employee's tort is outside the scope of employ-
ment, unless the agency relationship aids the employee in the 
commission of the tort. 51 Since sexual harassment is outside 
the scope of a supervisor's duties, the Court premised employer 
liability for supervisor harassment on the fact that the agency 
relationship empowers a supervisor with the employer's au-
thority to make job-affecting decisions.52 Even if the supervisor 
does not directly threaten, for example, to fire or demote an 
employee, subordinates are constantly aware of the supervi-
sor's power to make these types of decisions.53 This authority 
increases the likelihood that an employee will endure a super-
visor's sexually harassing behavior.54 Although an employee 
might feel comfortable rebuking the advances of a co-worker 
without fear of retribution, the same may not be true when the 
harasser is the employee's supervisor. 55 Thus, an argument 
exists that the agency relationship always aids a supervisor to 
harass subordinates.56 
While the agency relationship could potentially justify 
strict vicarious liability for every instance of supervisor har-
assment, the Court previously rejected automatic employer li-
ability in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 57 To resolve a poten-
tial conflict between Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. 
50 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1998). Restatement (Second) of Agency Law § 
219(2)(d) (1958). A tort is "[a) civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usu 
[ally) in the form of damages; a breach of a duty that the law imposes on everyone in 
the same relation to one another as those involved in a given transaction." BLACK'S 
LAw DrCTIONARY 1496 (7th ed. 1999). 
51 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998). 
52 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799-802 (1998); Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757,759-60 (1998). 
63 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998). 
54 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998); see Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank. v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986). 
55 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998); see Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998). 
66 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998). 
57 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 & n.4 (1998); Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998); Meritor Say. Bank. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57,73 (1986). 
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Ellerth, the Court created a reasonable-care defense that is 
available to employers when the harassment does not result in 
a tangible employment action.58 A "tangible employment ac-
tion" is a job-affecting decision that requires use of the power 
invested in the supervisor by the employer, "such as hiring, 
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly dif-
ferent responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 
change in benefits."59 Tangible employment actions justify 
automatic liability because deciding to fire or demote an em-
ployee who rejects a supervisor sexually is a decision that the 
supervisor was able to make because of the agency relation-
ship.GO On the other hand, when a supervisor harasses other 
employees by telling dirty jokes or making sexually derogatory 
comments, the importance of the supervisor's position within 
the company is less apparent.G1 Thus, employers have an op-
portunity to avoid automatic liability for otherwise actionable 
harassment by showing that they acted reasonably to prevent 
and correct sexual harassment and that the victim-employees 
acted unreasonably by failing to avoid harm.G2 
D. THE REASONABLE-CARE DEFENSE REFLECTS IMPORTANT 
PRINCIPLES BEHIND TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
Moreover, the reasonable-care defense reflects important 
policies behind Title VII, such as preventing discrimination 
and avoiding unnecessary injury.G3 Employers have an affirma-
tive duty to prevent workplace harassment, and employees 
have a duty to avoid unnecessary harm. 64 When no tangible 
employment action occurs, the employer can escape liability for 
58 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 & nA (1998); Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
59 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). 
60 [d. at 762-63. 
61 [d. at 763. 
62 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
63 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-806 (1998); Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). ("Title VII borrows from tort law the 
avoidable consequences doctrine") The avoidable consequences doctrine states that the 
injured party should not recover for more injuries than those injuries that she could not 
avoid through her own due diligence. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC 458 U.S. 219, 232 n.15 
(1982). 
64 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) 
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otherwise actionable harassment by establishing the following 
elements: (1) the employer acted reasonably to prevent or cor-
rect the harassment; and (2) that the plaintiff failed to rea-
sonably avoid harm by taking advantage of the employer's pre-
ventive or corrective opportunities or through other available 
means.65 
Under the first prong of the reasonable-care defense, an 
employer is required to take preventive action in accordance 
with the employment situation.66 An employer should inform 
employees that the employer will not tolerate sexual harass-
ment in its workplace.67 Furthermore, the employer should 
encourage employees to report harassment.68 Additionally, em-
ployers should educate employees about harassment so that 
employees know the difference between appropriate and inap-
propriate conduct.69 Formal anti-harassment policies are en-
couraged, but they are not required.70 The larger the employer, 
the more likely courts will find that the employer needs a for-
mal grievance procedure.71 Under the second prong of the de-
fense, employees should use whatever means the employer has 
made available to complain about sexual harassment.72 Under 
certain circumstances, however, an employee's failure to use 
the employer's grievance mechanism may be reasonable. 73 For 
example, if the employer does not inform its employees about 
its anti-harassment policy and complaint procedures, then the 
employee's failure to use the complaint procedures would be 
reasonable. 74 
65 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
66 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
67 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (2004). 
6B 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (2004). 
69 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (2004). 
70 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
71 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,808-9 (1998). 
72 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
73 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,808-9 (1998). 
74 See id. 
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E. THE REASONABLE-WOMAN STANDARD 
When internal procedures fail and the harassed employee 
files suit against the employer, the factfinder must decide 
whether actionable sexual harassment has occurred.75 In Elli-
son u. Brady, the Ninth Circuit, recognizing that the reason-
able person standard tended to be male-biased, held that the 
factfinder should evaluate the severity and pervasiveness of a 
"hostile work environment" from the perspective of the victim.76 
A contrary decision would allow the harasser to determine the 
level of acceptable workplace conduct.77 By adopting a reason-
able-woman standard, the Ninth Circuit explained that it 
would take into account the common concerns women share 
about sexual behavior that men do not share.7s At the same 
time, this objective standard protects employers from "the idio-
syncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive [sic] employee."79 
The reasonable-woman standard arises in "hostile environ-
ment" cases and tangible employment action cases when plain-
tiffs allege that their supervisors made implicit threats to co-
erce the plaintiffs into sexual relationships.so 
75 Elements of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim include: "showing that a 
supervisor explicitly or implicitly conditionledl a job, a job benefit, or a job detriment, 
upon an employee's acceptance of sexual conduct." Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 
F.3d 1158, 1170 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Elements of a "hos-
tile work environment sexual harassment" claim include: 1) conduct of verbal or sexual 
nature, 2) conduct "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the vic-
tim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Fuller v. City of Oak-
land, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) (to be actionable sexual harassment must be 
sex discrimination). 
76 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
77 [d. at 878. 
78 [d. at 879. 
79 [d. 
80 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (reasonable-woman stan-
dard used in hostile environment harassment cases); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 
F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasonable-woman standard used in coerced submis-
sion cases). 
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F. HOLLY D. V. CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
1. Factual and Procedural History 
Holly D. presented a novel issue to the Ninth Circuit: 
whether an employee who submits to a supervisor's implicit 
quid pro quo threat has suffered a tangible employment ac-
tion.81 Holly D., was a single parent suffering from clinical de-
pression and financial difficulties who worked for several years 
at Caltech.82 After approximately four years, Caltech promoted 
Holly D. to Senior Division Assistant, working under Professor 
Stephen Wiggins in Caltech's Control Dynamic Systems de-
partment.83 Caltech policy required Holly D. to go through a 
six-month probationary period.84 During her probationary pe-
riod, she alleged that Professor Wiggins eyed her chests and 
buttocks, made inappropriate comments of a sexual nature, 
and exposed her to pornographic websites.85 Holly D. also al-
leged that Professor Wiggins complained about the quality of 
her work and threatened to retain her on probationary status 
indefinitely.86 Holly D. admitted that Professor Wiggins would 
stop his sexually offensive conduct when she expressed unin-
terest.87 After her probationary period ended, she received a 
performance evaluation from Professor Wiggins that she con-
sidered negative.88 Holly D. believed that Professor Wiggins 
gave her a "negative" evaluation because she rebuked his sex-
ual advances.89 Holly D. decided that she would have to submit 
to Professor Wiggins sexually in order to retain her job.90 
Holly D.'s and Professor Wiggins's first sexual encounter 
occurred in July of 1997, shortly after her review.91 Professor 
81 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003). 
82 Id.at 1162. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
55 Id. at 1163. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1163. 
88 Id. at 1163 & n.2. The court reviewed the evaluation and noted that the over-
all evaluation was good but not one of the eight individually rated categories was rated 
higher than satisfactory and half were rated unsatisfactory or fair. Id. 1163 n.2. 
89 Id. at 1163. 
90 Id. at 1163. 
91 Id. at 1164. 
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Wiggins came into Holly D.'s office and asked her what turned 
her on.92 She replied, "[w] hen people talk dirty.''93 Professor 
Wiggins then asked her, "[w] ill you suck my dick?" She re-
plied, "yes."94 After their last sexual encounter in July of 1998, 
Holly D. spit semen onto her coat to preserve evidence of the 
encounter.95 
Holly D. knew that Professor Wiggins was sexually harass-
ing her.96 She also knew that Caltech had a sexual harassment 
policy.97 She did not report the harassment, however, because 
she believed the university would favor a professor over a cleri-
cal employee.98 After the sexual relationship stopped, Holly D. 
applied unsuccessfully for several positions within the univer-
sity.99 Believing that the other departments denied her trans-
fers because she had previously taken disability leave for her 
clinical depression, Holly D. filed a disability discrimination 
claim with the EEOC.loo The EEOC investigated her com-
plaint, but the EEOC found insufficient evidence to support her 
disability charge. lol Shortly after the EEOC's determination, 
Holly D. reported the sexual harassment to an ombudsman. 102 
In 1999, Holly D. filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging 
sexual harassment.103 The EEOC sent Caltech a letter inform-
ing the university of Holly D.'s complaint.I04 Pursuant to Cal-
92 Id. at 1164. 
93 Id. at 1164-
94 Id. 
95Id. 
96 Id. at 1165, 1177. 
97Id. 
98 Id. at 1165. 
99 Id. at 1164. 
100 Id. 
101Id. 
102 Id. An ombudsman is "[al n official appointed to receive, investigate, and 
report on private citizens' complaints about the government [orl [al similar appointee 
in a nongovernmental organization (such as a company or university)." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1115 (7th ed. 1999). 
103 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). "At Holly 
D.'s request, the EEOC issued her a right-to-sue notice without an investigation." Id. 
at 1165. Right-to-sue notices are mandated by statute. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (West 2004) 
(notice must be given to parties after investigation is completed). "A right-to-sue notice 
is issued to the charging party after the EEOC concludes its investigation if any. The 
charging party has 90 days after receipt of the right-to sue notice in which to file her 
suit." EEOC, Charge Processing Procedures, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview3harge_processing.html (last accessed on Mar. 
13,2004). 
104 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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tech policy, Caltech assembled a neutral committee to investi-
gate Holly D.'s sexual harassment allegations. lo5 The commit-
tee investigated Holly D.'s claim by interviewing Holly D., Pro-
fessor Wiggins, and other employees. lOG Professor Wiggins de-
nied that he and Holly D. had sexual relations.lo7 During the 
initial investigation, Holly D. did not produce the specimen 
that she had kept. lOB The committee found insufficient evidence 
to support Holly D.'s claim.lo9 It recommended, however, that 
Caltech transfer Holly D. to a female professor and review the 
sexual harassment policy with Professor Wiggins.110 
Originally, Holly D. brought her sexual harassment claims 
under Title VII and the Fair Employment and Housing Act 
against Wiggins and Caltech in California state court.1ll "Cal-
tech removed the case to the [United States] District Court for 
the Central District of California, and then moved for summary 
judgment."112 The district court granted summary judgment 
against Holly D.'s Title VII claims, holding that she had not 
suffered a tangible employment action because she retained 
her position, received raises, and she did not lose any employ-
ment benefits.113 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed sum-
mary judgment on the Title VII claims, but adopted a different 
legal standard to evaluate the tangible employment action is-
sue. 114 
105 1d. at 1165. 
106 1d. 
1071d. 
1081d. at 1165 n.7. After Holly D. filed her suit, the semen stain on the coat was 
tested. 1d. The semen was identified as Professor Wiggins's, and Caltech requested 
that Wiggins resign from his position. [d. 
109 1d. at 1165. 
11°1d. 
111 1d. Holly D. also alleged claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 and several state law tort causes of action. 1d. Holly D.'s Title VII claim against 
Professor Wiggins is omitted for the remainder of this summation because Title VII 
does not allow recovery by a plaintiff against a supervisor, even if the supervisor was 
the harasser. 1d. at 1179. 
112 1d. at 1165. 
1131d. 
114 1d. at 1167-69, 1179. The Ninth circuit reversed the lower court's grant of 
summary judgment on Holly D.'s state law claims and remanded the state law claims 
with instructions to remand the state law claims back to state court. 1d. at 1181. 
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2. Ninth Circuit's Analysis 
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton holdings, the 
Ninth Circuit dealt first with the issue of whether coerced 
submission constituted a tangible employment actionYS Nei-
ther Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth nor Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton considered whether a tangible employment ac-
tion occurs when an employee submits sexually to her supervi-
sor to keep her job,us Successful coercion, achieved by threats 
of termination and demotion, and unsuccessful coercion, result-
ing in the employee's termination or demotion, derive from the 
same abuse of supervisorial power.1l7 In both situations, the 
supervisor uses the "weight of the employer's enterprise in or-
der to achieve the unlawful purpose. "118 Therefore, in the Ninth 
Circuit, retaining an employee who submits to a quid-pro-quo 
threat is a tangible employment action.1l9 When a supervisor 
successfully coerces sex from a subordinate by threatening a 
tangible employment action, the supervisor has made partici-
pation in unwanted sexual acts a condition of employment.12o 
The agency relationship makes the supervisor's threat success-
ful, and thus, the employer is liable to the harassment victim.l21 
To make a prima facie case for successful coercion the 
plaintiff must establish that the supervisor made an explicit or 
implicit quid-pro-quo threat.122 Holly D. alleged that Professor 
Wiggins implicitly conditioned her employment upon sexual 
submission to him.123 To prove an implicit threat, the plaintiff 
must show that a reasonable-woman in her position would 
have believed that her supervisor was conditioning her em-
ployment on her willingness to submit to his sexual advances.124 
The Ninth Circuit noted that Holly D. failed to argue that a 
115 [d. at 1166. 
116 [d. at 1168. 
117 [d. at 1168. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. at 1171 n.l8. 
120 [d. at 1169. 
121 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802-3, 805 (1998); Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 763 (1998) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57 (1986»; Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003). 
122 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003). 
123 [d. 
124 [d. at 1173-74. 
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different standard of reasonableness should apply in light of 
her financial and psychological difficulties.125 
Implicit threats require cautious consideration in order to 
protect the innocent party, whether that party is the defendant 
or the plaintiff.12G Creating sterile or barren workplaces is not a 
Title VII objective. 127 Anti-sexual harassment law under Title 
VII should protect consensual romances in the work place.128 
Weighing the evidence that Holly D. presented, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a reasonable woman in her position would not 
have believed that Professor Wiggins implicitly threatened to 
fire her if she rejected his sexual advances.129 Although Profes-
sor Wiggins created a sexually charged environment, Holly D. 
knew that he would stop this behavior if she asked him to.130 
Furthermore, Holly D. did not produce any evidence that Pro-
fessor Wiggins ever made a connection between the sexual and 
the employment relationships.131 On the day of their first sex-
ual encounter, Holly D. and Professor Wiggins did not discuss 
work. 132 Their conversation was purely sexual.133 
After holding that Professor Wiggins did not coerce Holly 
D. into a sexual relationship, the Ninth Circuit considered 
Holly D.'s claim under a "hostile work environment" theory.134 
The Ninth Circuit assumed that Holly D. presented sufficient 
evidence at the district court level to make a prima facie case 
for "hostile work environment sexual harassment" against Cal-
tech. 135 Next, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Caltech 
met the elements of the reasonable-care defense.13G Holly D. 
125 [d. 1174 n.19. 
126 [d. 1174. 
127 [d. 
126 See id. at 1174. 
129 [d. at 1175. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. The court notes that she provided three instances in deposition testimony 
of his conduct that she believed proved he was threatening her; however, all three 
occurred a significant amount of time outside of the time period in which the sexual 
relationship took place. [d. at 1164 n.3. 
132 [d. at 1175. 
133 [d. 
134 [d. at 1176. The Court discusses the fact that "hostile environment harass-
ment" might not be the best phrase for sexual harassment that does not involve a tan-
gible employment action; however, it uses this term for lack of a better one. [d. at 1167 
n.13. 
135 [d. at 1176. 
136 [d. at 1177-79. 
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used affidavits from an expert to argue that Caltech acted un-
reasonably in designing its sexual harassment policy.137 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected her argument because the reasonable-
care defense is not a question of what the employer should 
have done to improve its anti-harassment policy.138 Instead, an 
employer discharges its duty under the reasonable-care defense 
if its actions were reasonably calculated to prevent and correct 
sexual harassment.139 Caltech acted reasonably by immediately 
investigating Holly D.'s claim after Caltech received notice of 
her complaint.140 Furthermore, Holly D.'s complete failure to 
use Caltech's reporting procedures was unreasonable.141 Cal-
tech qualified for the reasonable-care defense.142 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and remanded the 
state law claims.143 
II. CRITIQUE OF THE REASONABLE WOMAN SUFFERING FROM 
EMOTIONAL OR FINANCIAL DISABILITIES STANDARDS 
In Holly D., the Ninth Circuit suggested that a plaintiffs 
subjective emotional or financial disabilities might have legal 
significance in sexual harassment litigation brought under Ti-
tle VII. 144 Adopting this suggestion would create customized 
standards of reasonableness, and would adversely affect both 
employers and employees.145 Such a change would detrimen-
137 [d. at 1177. The expert's affidavit claimed that there were six different things 
that Caltech could have done differently to make its anti-harassment policy reasonable, 
the court mentions two ofthem: 
Mandatory trainings and peer review of supervisors. [d. at 1177. 
138 [d. at 1177. 
139 [d. 
140 [d. at 1177-78. 
141 [d. at 1179. 
142 [d. at 1177-79. 
143 [d. at 118l. 
144 [d. at 1174 n.19 (noting that the Ninth Circuit may consider the effects of a 
plaintiffs emotional and financial disabilities if raised in a future case). 
145 Customized standards of reasonableness are virtually subjective standards for 
plaintiffs who have emotional or financial disabilities. Although the Ninth Circuit 
phrased its suggested new standards in objective terms, the truth is that the more the 
reasonable-woman standard resembles the actual plaintiff, the less objective it be-
comes. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) (reason-
able-woman suffering with emotional or financial disabilities); cf. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET 
AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 55-56 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the use of the characteris-
tics of the reasonable person standard in relation to the tort of negligence). "Custom-
ized" "subjective" or "tailored" as used to modify standard or reasonable-woman stan-
18
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tally affect an employer's liability for supervisor harassment of 
a subordinate, and an employer's ability to use the reasonable-
care defense.146 Customized reasonable-woman standards 
would harm employees by creating inconsistent results in Title 
VII cases and by forcing romance out of the workplace.147 
Customizing the reasonable-woman standard for plaintiffs 
who suffer from emotional and financial disabilities would be 
problematic for three reasons. First, these customized stan-
dards increase the scope of employer liability for supervisor 
sexual harassment of a subordinate by allowing the plaintiffs 
disabilities to control when a supervisor has misused the em-
ployer's authority and by allowing the plaintiffs disability to 
excuse the plaintiff from reporting harassment.148 Second, ap-
plying multiple standards to this decision would lead to dis-
criminatory treatment of women under the law.149 Women with 
factually similar cases would find themselves with contradic-
tory holdings.15o Finally, customized standards would stifle ro-
mance in the workplace.151 Employers and supervisors would 
have greater reason to fear sanctions under these more subjec-
tive standards that would discourage social relationships be-
tween consenting employees.152 
A. WIDENING THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY BY 
DECLARING THAT WHICH IS UNREASONABLE, REASONABLE 
Customized standards of reasonableness would increase 
the scope of employer liability in two distinct ways. First, 
these standards would increase the occurrence of "tangible em-
ployment action sexual harassment" where the plaintiff alleges 
that the supervisor made an implicit quid-pro-quo threat. The 
existence of a threat would depend on the plaintiff's disability 
and not the supervisor's use of authority to extort sex. Hence, 
the Ninth Circuit would broaden employer liability beyond the 
dard refer to the reasonable-woman suffering with emotional or financial disabilities 
standard. 
146 See infra notes 153-176 and accompanying text. 
147 See infra notes 177-201 and accompanying text. 
148 See infra notes 153-168 and accompanying text. 
149 See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text. 
150 See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text. 
151 See infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text. 
152 See infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text. 
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principles of agency law. Second, customized standards would 
interfere with employers' successful use of the reasonable-care 
defense by treating employees who fail to use their employers' 
grievance procedures as reasonable. The Ninth Circuit can 
avoid these undesirable results by maintaining the reasonable-
woman standard. 
In cases alleging that the supervisor used an implicit 
threat to coerce the plaintiff into sexual relations, the fact-
finder should carefully consider the facts and look for a nexus 
between the supervisor's allegedly threatening behavior, and 
the supervisor's request for sexual relations.153 If there is a 
nexus between the threatening behavior and the sexual ad-
vances, then the factfinder should hold the employer liable for 
"tangible employment action sexual harassment. "154 If the fact-
finder finds that the supervisor did not use implicit threats to 
coerce the plaintiff into performing sexual acts with the super-
visor, then the factfinder should find that that the employer is 
not liable for "tangible employment action sexual harass-
ment. "155 Maintaining focus on the interactions between the 
supervisor and the plaintiff prevents falsely holding employers 
liable for "tangible employment action sexual harassment. "156 
Under customized standards, the plaintiff would divert the 
factfinder's attention from the supervisor's conduct, redirecting 
that attention to the plaintiffs disability. This diversion would 
occur because the plaintiff would need to convince the jury that 
she suffered from a disability and that this disability affected 
her perception of the supervisor's conduct.157 Focusing on the 
plaintiffs disabilities is problematic because depression and 
153 Holly D. v. Cal. lost. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) "Har· 
assment in cases of implicit conditioning can be inferred only from the particular facts 
and circumstances of the case. We must examine each such charge with the utmost 
care, for an error either way can result in a gross injustice and will often have a disas· 
trous impact on the life of whichever person is truly the injured party)." [d. at 1174. 
154 [d. at 1169, 1173. 
155 See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that Holly D. failed to establish that Wiggins coerced her into a sexual relationship). 
156 See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 1994». 
157 Since the Ninth Circuit did not consider the effects of Holly D.'s disabilities on 
her perception of Wiggins's conduct because she did not present evidence showing that 
a different standard should apply to her, a future plaintiff who wishes to use this stan-
dard would need to provide the factfinder with evidence to establish the effects of these 
disabilities on the plaintiffs perception. Holly D. v. Cal. lost. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 
1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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economic difficulties can distort perception. ISS Customized 
standards would create situations where the jury might find an 
implicit threat that is the product of a plaintiffs psychological 
distress.159 Agency principles do not justify this result. Em-
ployers are liable for supervisor harassment because they em-
power their supervisors with job-affecting authority. ISO Courts 
should not impose liability on employers when the cause of the 
problem is the plaintiffs psychological difficulties. 
Consider, for example, Holly D.'s allegation that Professor 
Wiggins gave her an unsatisfactory review about three weeks 
before coming to her office and asking her "what turned her 
on."lSl Had Holly D. raised the issue of the effect of her depres-
sion and financial troubles to the court, she would likely have 
left the court victorious.1s2 Her victory, however, would have 
158 See Ronald Pitzer, Negative Thinking and Depression, Stress Management 
Briefs from the University of Minnesota (1985, copyright 2004), at 
http://www.extension.umn.eduldistributionlfamilydevelopmenticomponentsJ726 
9ca.htmI. (negative thinking thought to cause depression. Also, depressed individuals 
"may base an overall conclusion on a single event);" see also Melissa Dittmann, The 
Social Class Factor Psychologists conveyed poverty's mental health effects on the dis-
advantaged and chronically ill, Monitor on Psychology, Vol. 34, No.9, Oct. 2003, at 36 
(available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct03/socialclass.html)(last accessed on Mar. 
13,2004) 
(poverty is connected to depression, feeling of low self-esteem, and helplessness). In 
regards to economic disabilities, a future plaintiff might argue that her extreme finan-
cial needs colored her understanding of her supervisor's conduct. Cf Holly D. v. Cal. 
Inst. of Tech., 339 F3d. 1158, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (focusing on the supervisor's threat 
in a coercion case instead of the subordinate's "capacity to resist his advances" because 
the Ninth Circuit recognized that some employees may desperately need the income to 
make a house payment or the health benefits for a sick child); see also Jin v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 99 (2nd Cir. 2002). It is difficult to predict the intentions of 
another person. An employee who cannot afford to lose her position would arguably be 
more likely submit and arguably more likely to see a threat in the first instance. Her 
economic position does not leave her room to gamble on the chance that her supervisor 
is a decent person who would not use his position with the company to coerce sex from 
other employees. 
159 See supra note 158. 
160 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799-802 (1998); Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 757, 759-760 (1998) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57 (1986»; Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003). 
161 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003). 
162 The fact that the Ninth Circuit noted that it would consider this issue ifit was 
appropriately raised in a future case implies that if Holly D. had established that de-
pression and financial difficulties affected her view of Wiggins's behavior that the 
Ninth Circuit would have taken her disabilities into account. See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. 
of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 
503, 512 (9th Cir. 1994) (listing other traits that the Ninth Circuit might incorporate 
into the reasonable woman standard, such as "race, age, physical or mental disability, 
and sexual orientation"); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) 
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been at the expense of justice because her victory would have 
been due to her personal difficulties and not because Professor 
Wiggins abused his supervisory power to coerce her into having 
sex with him.163 If the Ninth Circuit adopts customized stan-
dards of reasonableness, it would in effect begin to hold em-
ployers liable for hiring individuals with emotional or financial 
difficulties. 
Conditioning employer liability on the plaintiffs distorted 
perception of the supervisor's conduct does not further work-
place equality. While the idea of an emotionally or financially 
depressed individual submitting sexually to her supervisor in 
order to "save" her job is distressing, the fact remains that Title 
VII is concerned with eliminating gender discrimination.164 
Furthermore, compensating a plaintiff for an injury that she 
suffered because of her emotional or financial depression does 
not resolve the plaintiffs real problem. Title VII litigation 
should result in verdicts that breakdown barriers for women in 
the workplace, not verdicts that attempt to sooth the ailing 
psyches of the plaintiffs.165 
In addition to increasing the number of coerced submission 
cases, customized standards would also interfere with employ-
ers' abilities to successfully invoke the reasonable-care defense 
in "hostile work environment sexual harassment" cases. Em-
ployees have a duty to avoid unnecessary harm; reporting the 
("hostile work environment" must be determined from the perspective of a reasonable 
person with the same fundamental characteristics)." Holly Do's disabilities could have 
affected her perception thus making it reasonable for her to construe Wiggins' words 
and actions as an implicit threat if she did not engage in sex with him. See infra note 
157. 
163 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (Holly D. 
alleged that Professor Wiggins's conduct constituted an implicit threat). 
164 The U.S. Supreme Court has made it very clear that sexual conduct violates 
Title VII only if the alleged harasser treated the plaintiff differently because of the 
plaintiffs sex. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) 
(citing Ginsburg's concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,25 (1993). 
165 It would be a very different situation if the plaintiff sought to prove that her 
supervisor used her disability to his advantage in order to obtain sexual favors. See 
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, (9th Cir. 1994). If a plaintiff can show actual knowledge 
of her disabilities and actual intent on the part of the supervisor to use those disabili-
ties to harass her, then I believe that the effect of these disabilities would be important 
to determining the existence of an implicit threat. [d. However, in Holly D. v. Califor-
nia Institute of Technology, the Ninth Circuit did not suggest that it would require the 
plaintiff to show that the supervisor had actual knowledge of the plaintiffs disabilities. 
See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 359 F3d 1158, 1173-74 & n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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harassment to the employer usually discharges this duty.166 
Under customized standards, however, there would be a very 
strong possibility that courts might excuse emotionally or fi-
nancially depressed employees from reporting harassment to 
their employers. Low self-esteem and feelings of helplessness 
are symptoms of these conditions. 167 An employee who feels 
helpless is likely to believe, just as Holly D. did, that reporting 
the harassment would be useless. 16s Thus, it would be reason-
able for an emotionally or financially depressed woman to 
forego reporting harassment to her employer. Unfortunately, 
short of video surveillance many large employers might not be 
able to adequately police their workplaces for harassment 
without the help of their employees. The courts should not en-
courage employees to avoid reporting sexual harassment by 
calling this omission "reasonable" for employees who suffer 
from emotional or financial disabilities. 
By maintaining the status quo and rejecting customized 
standards, the Ninth Circuit can ensure that employer liability 
extends from the principles of agency law and not judicial sym-
pathy for the terrible effects of psychological disabilities. Fur-
thermore, the Ninth Circuit can protect the important Title VII 
policies that the reasonable-care defense furthers.169 The rea-
sonable-woman standard is the appropriate standard to apply 
because it balances the interests of all parties concerned.170 
166 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 807-808 (1998); Burlington In-
dus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
167 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC., DEPRESSION, 21 (2002); see Melissa Ditt-
mann, supra note 158. 
168 See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(Holly D. did not report the harassment because she thought that it would be useless.) 
169 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-6 (1998) (discussing policies 
behind Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). 
170 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (the reasonable-care 
defense rewards employers who meet their duty to attempt to rid their workplaces of 
sexual harassment and it holds employees reasonable for avoiding unnecessary injury). 
For a deeper appreciation of the arguments for and against the use of gender specific 
standards see Paul P. Dumont, Comment, Radtke v. Everett: An Analysis of the Michi-
gan Supreme Court's Rejection of the Reasonable Woman/Victim Standard: Treating 
Perspectives That Are Different as Though They Were Exactly Alike, 27 GoLDEN GATE 
U.L. REV. 255 (1997) (using feminist theory to support the reasonable woman stan-
dard); but see Saba Ashraf, The Reasonableness of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard: 
An Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483 (1992) (asserting that the 
reasonable person standard is the appropriate standard for evaluating "hostile work 
environment harassment)." 
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The reasonable-woman standard stops the supervisor and the 
employer from discriminating against women by denying them 
the right to set the standard of appropriate workplace con-
duct. l7l The reasonable-woman standard also takes the con-
cerns of women into consideration in defIning actionable sexual 
harassment.172 Furthermore, this standard protects employers 
from liability by checking the plaintiff's notions of unacceptable 
workplace conduct against that of a reasonable female. 173 Con-
gress did not intend Title VII to prevent all offensive behavior. 
174 What Title VII does restrict is the use of immutable charac-
teristics to bar certain individuals with these characteristics 
from an equal opportunity to enter the workforce and succeed 
at their jobs.175 Through the reasonable-woman standard, 
courts can ensure that they do not turn Title VII into a civility 
statute.176 
B. UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF WOMEN UNDER THE LAw 
The second problem customized standards would create is 
inconsistent verdicts for the same or similar conduct. Title VII 
seeks to end discriminatory employment decisions made on the 
basis of an individual's membership in a particular group.177 
Interpreting the statute should not result in legal standards 
that create a preference for one group over another.178 Fur-
thermore, courts should not create favored sub-groups within a 
protected groUp.179 Doing so furthers discrimination, instead of 
ending it. Customizing the reasonable-woman standard for 
emotionally and fInancially disabled women would discrimi-
171 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). 
172 Id. at 879 
173Id. at 879. 
174 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
175 See id. 
176 Id.at 81(Title VII does not protect individuals from every insult or injury that 
they might suffer in the workplace). 
177 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, (1971). (Racial discrimination 
case). "Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and 
only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers oper-
ate invidiously to discriminate based on racial or other impermissible classification." 
Id. 
178 See Id. 
179 Women would be the main protected group and emotionally or financially 
disabled women would be sub-groups within this protected group. 
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nate against women who would not qualify for one of these 
standards. Two women with identical complaints might find 
themselves with disparate responses from the courts if only one 
of these women could take advantage of the customized stan-
dards proposed by the Ninth Circuit. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following scenarios. 
In scenario one, supervisor Sam is attracted to employee Eve. 
Sam flirts with Eve. Believing that she reciprocates his attrac-
tion, he asks her out on a date. Eve rejects Sam's invitation, 
explaining that she does not think it would be a good idea to 
date her boss. Sam ignores her rejection, telling Eve that they 
could keep the date a secret. Eve persists in her rejection so 
Sam nods and walks away. Three weeks later, Sam calls Eve 
into his office and counsels her about some errors she made on 
the last report she submitted. Eve has been having trouble in 
her personal life. She recently divorced, and her teenage son is 
not adjusting well. She does not tell Sam about her home trou-
bles because she does not want to seem as if she is making ex-
cuses. 
Sam tells Eve that she is an excellent worker and that he 
would not be so concerned about her recent errors if it were not 
for the fact that the company is talking about eliminating jobs. 
He suggests that she be extra careful to avoid errors in the fu-
ture. Then, if the company decides to eliminate some of its 
workforce, she would not be one of the workers laid off. Eve is 
distraught over this meeting, unsure whether the supervisor is 
trying to help her keep her job, or make her fear that she is 
losing it. A week after this meeting, Sam and Eve are at a re-
tirement party hosted by their company for one of its vice-
presidents. Champagne flows, and Sam strikes up a conversa-
tion with Eve. Their conversation begins with pleasantries and 
then moves into the office. Eve asks Sam whether the rumors 
about layoffs starting in the next couple of weeks are true. He 
tells her that he cannot answer her question. Sam knows that 
lay-offs will happen in a couple of weeks, but the company in-
structed supervisors to keep that knowledge to themselves un-
til the company officially announces its decision. 
They talk more as the night progresses; eventually, Sam 
asks Eve to dance. At the end of the evening, Sam offers Eve a 
ride home. She agrees so that she will not have to wait for a 
taxi. Parked in front of Eve's home, Sam kisses her. Eve does 
not push Sam way so he asks if he might come in for a night-
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cap. Eve considers Sam's request for a few moments, more 
than a little concerned that rejecting him again might cost her 
job. She believes the rumors about lay-offs are true, and feels 
that Sam's evasive response earlier that evening confirms her 
belief. She does not want to lose her job so she invites him in-
side. Later that night, Sam and Eve have sex. 
A couple of weeks pass, the company orders its supervisors 
to pick employees for the first round of lay-offs. Sam picks 
three employees, but retains Eve. Believing that Sam kept her 
because she slept with him, Eve continues the sexual relation-
ship. Eventually, she feels as though she can no longer con-
tinue in her relationship with Sam, but she is afraid to end it 
because the company is still laying people off. 
She talks to a friend about her problem. This friend sug-
gests that she contact an attorney. Taking her friend's advice, 
Eve contacts a lawyer who tells her that her employer could be 
liable for sexual harassment if a jury finds that her supervisor 
unlawfully coerced her into sexual relations. She decides to file 
a complaint with the EEOC, requesting a right-to-sue notice 
without an investigation. Subsequently, she files her suit in 
the appropriate district court within the Ninth Circuit. Eve is 
financially and emotionally stable. Therefore, she would be 
subject to the reasonable-woman standard. The employer 
moves for summary judgment, arguing that a reasonable-
woman would not have believed that her supervisor was condi-
tioning her continued employment on her willingness to submit 
to him sexually. The court carefully considers the facts of the 
case and holds that there is an insufficient nexus between 
Sam's sexual advances and his employment decisions to find 
that the Sam abused his power in order to extort sex from Eve. 
The district court grants summary judgment in favor of the 
employer. 
Scenario two consists of the same set of facts as scenario 
one, except that it involves supervisor Steve and employee 
Elaine. Elaine has not handled her recent divorce well. 
Shortly after her divorce, she began seeing a psychiatrist who 
diagnosed her with depression. Elaine presents affidavits to 
the court from an expert who swears to testify that Elaine's 
depression made it reasonable for Elaine to believe that Steve 
implicitly threatened Elaine with termination if she did not 
have sex with Steve. The district court excludes the expert's 
testimony because the Ninth Circuit uses a reasonable-woman 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss1/6
2004] THE REASONABLE-WOMAN STANDARD 153 
standard to determine the existence of an implicit threat. The 
plaintiff appeals the lower court's decision. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considers the employee's dis-
abilities in deciding whether it was reasonable for her to con-
clude that her supervisor was conditioning her continued em-
ployment on her willingness to engage in sexual relations with 
him. The court reasons that depressed women have special 
concerns that "normal" women do not share. Negative thinking 
and depression are companions; an individual suffering with 
depression could reasonably conclude that her supervisor coun-
seled her about her errors to threaten her job, not to save it. ISO 
The Ninth Circuit holds that the factfinder should view Eve's 
Title VII claims from the perspective of a reasonable-woman 
suffering with depression. The case is then remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with its hold-
ing. At trial, the expert testifies that depressed woman would 
view Steve's actions as threatening. lSI The trial judge deter-
mines that the expert's testimony is reliable and instructs the 
jury to consider the evidence in light of the plaintiff's emotional 
difficulties. The jury finds for the plaintiff, holding the defen-
dant liable for Elaine's injuries to the tune of $500,000. 
The conclusions of these two cases would result in Elaine 
receiving compensation for the ''wrong" she suffered, while Eve 
is left to forge on, believing that she has been wronged not only 
by her supervisor and her employer, but also by the justice sys-
tem. These conflicting results would defy justification under 
Title VII. Discriminatory treatment by the courts does not fur-
ther Congress's efforts to eliminate discriminatory employment 
decisions. ls2 Equal treatment in the workplace should result in 
equal treatment under the law. While emotionally or finan-
cially depressed individuals have special concerns that not all 
women share, individuals with these concerns should not re-
ceive preferential treatment under a statute concerned with 
180 See Pitzer, supra note 158. 
IS1Id. 
IS2 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75,80 (1998) (Con-
gress struck at all disparate treatment between the sexes); see also Meritor Say. Bank 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
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eliminating disparate employment decisions made because of 
an individual's gender. ls3 
C. THE FRIGID WORKPLACE 
Customized standards would unduly burden consensual 
workplace romance by making the risk outweigh the benefit of 
finding love at work. Under the reasonable-care defense, an 
employer must show that it acted reasonably to prevent and 
correct sexual harassment. ls4 One way that an employer can 
meet this duty is by creating and enforcing a sexual harass-
ment grievance procedure. ls5 In the Ninth Circuit, an employer 
discharges this duty by demonstrating that it designed a plan 
that it reasonably expected would prevent and correct sexual 
harassment. ls6 Customized standards of reasonableness would 
charge employers with the responsibility of devising separate 
plans that would adequately protect employees who suffered 
from one of the named disabilities, as well as for employees 
who did not. Although it might seem easier for the employer to 
resolve this issue by setting the standard of workplace conduct 
by the higher threshold that customized standards would de-
mand, this solution would not work because employers also 
. face liability if they wrongfully sanction an employee for violat-
ing the anti-harassment policy.lS7 Thus, the law would burden 
employers with devising plans that meet the needs of the emo-
tionally and financially disabled as well as those of typical em-
ployees. 
A problem that is inherent in fashioning anti-harassment 
policies that incorporate definitions of harassment for emotion-
ally and financially disabled employees is the fact that these 
disabilities affect perception. ISS Therefore, both problems would 
183 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) 
(stressing the fact that sexual harassment violates Title VII when it is discrimination 
because of the victim's sex). 
184 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,806-7 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
185 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,808-9 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). 
185 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158,1177 (9th Cir. 2003). 
187 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0 (2004) (employers should properly sanction employ-
ees who sexually harass other employees). 
185 See supra note 158. 
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require advanced knowledge of social psychology.189 In essence, 
employers would be asking their supervisors first to diagnosis 
their subordinates and then act accordingly. This expectation 
would be unreasonable, as most supervisors are not going to 
have the training needed to determine if employees suffer with 
one of these conditions. Even if a supervisor does assume that 
an employee has one of these problems, it is unreasonable to 
expect the supervisor to understand how the individual's condi-
tion might affect her perception of the supervisor's conduct. In 
light of the issues raised by customized standards, employers 
would need to find alternatives to reduce their risk ofliability. 
One alternative that employers would likely find attractive 
is an anti-fraternization policy.190 Anti-fraternization policies 
exist in different forms: some employers place an outright pro-
hibition on supervisor-subordinate dating, while others require 
that dating co-workers sign love contracts.19l Anti-
fraternization policies may effectively prevent sexual harass-
ment; however, these policies are undesirable because they 
solve the problem by avoiding the real issue. 192 Under federal 
law, sexual harassment is not merely a question of sexually 
offensive behavior; it is an issue of treating someone differently 
because of that person's gender.193 Conduct of a sexual nature 
must be severe and pervasive enough to change the conditions 
of the victim's employment before the accused harasser can be 
189 Social Psychology is "the psychological study of social behavior, esp[ecially] of 
the reciprocal influence of the individual and the group with which the individual in-
teracts." WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 1811 (Sol Steinmetz, et al. eds,. 2nd ed. 
1999). 
190 See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2120 (2003). 
Ms. Schultz discussed the attraction employers have to anti-fraternization policies 
under the current state of anti-harassment law. See id. I am proposing that custom-
ized reasonable-woman standards will increase the prevalence of anti-fraternization 
policies in the workplace. 
191 Id.at 2122-2123, 2126-2129 (describing a "love contract" as a letter sent to the 
subordinate employee by the supervising employee explaining that the relationship is 
voluntary and requiring her signature to show that she understands that the relation-
ship has no bearing on her position with the employer). 
192 Seth Howard Borden, Note, Love's Labor Law: Establishing a Uniform Inter-
pretation of New York's "Legal Recreational Activities" Law to Allow Employers to En-
force No-dating Policies, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 353, 379 (1996). Mr. Borden argues in 
favor of anti-harassment policies, explaining that forbidding relationships between 
employees will reduce the number of quid pro quo cases as long as most employees 
follow the rules. Id. 
193 E.g. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75,80 (1998). 
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found to have violated Title VII.194 Forbidding supervisor-
subordinate dating makes it easier for an employer to avoid 
liability. 195 Unfortunately, this supposed solution to the prob-
lem of sexual harassment would not eliminate work-related 
decisions made on the basis of gender. Banning dating merely 
makes the opposite sex forbidden fruit. Anti-fraternization 
policies fail to address the real problem with sexual harass-
ment: using sex to belittle a person or to make an individual 
feel incompetent at her job is discrimination because of that 
person's sex.196 Furthermore, anti-fraternization policies that 
prohibit dating contradict the Ninth Circuit's charge that sex-
ual harassment should not result in sterile workplaces.197 
Even if the employer does not implement an anti-
fraternization policy, supervisors are likely to self-impose 
workplace abstinence, as the risk of violating the anti-
harassment policy would increase under customized stan-
dards.19s The Ninth Circuit recognizes that employees of differ-
ent ranks within an organization can fall in love.199 If protect-
ing consensual relationships is important to the Ninth Circuit, 
as stated in Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology, then 
the court will not implement customized standards.20o More-
over, by rejecting customized standards, the Ninth Circuit 
would help to ensure that employers do not unjustly sanction 
supervisors for behavior that Title VII does not prohibit. While 
finding love at work may not be of interest to all employees, the 
courts and employers should not use federal anti-harassment 
law as a blocking mechanism for employees who might meet 
that special someone who just happens to be sitting three cubi-
cles away.20l 
194 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67 (1986). 
195 Borden, supra, note 192 at 379. 
196 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
197 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (the Supreme 
Court has also discouraged using Title VII to prevent workplace romance). 
198 See supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text. 
199 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations 
omitted). 
200 [d. 
201 A poll of 1000 workers found that 47% engaged in workplace romances and 
another 19% would be willing to engage in a workplace romance. Sue Shellenbarger, 
Workplace romances encounter obstacles, Wall Street Journal, reprinted in Contra 
Costa Times, Feb. 20, 2004, available at 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Instead of making changes to the reasonable-woman stan-
dard, the Ninth Circuit should focus on encouraging employers 
to properly police their workplaces for sexual harassment. The 
reasonable-care defense creates an incentive for employers to 
make use of these internal justice systems to eliminate work-
place harassment.202 The Ninth Circuit's holding in Holly D. v. 
California Institute of Technology should further reinforce em-
ployers' incentives to ensure that employees are encouraged to 
report threats.203 By barring employers from using the reason-
able-care defense in coercion cases, the Ninth Circuit reinforced 
the importance of preventing sexual harassment.204 Employers 
who wish to avoid liability for coercion cases need to vigorously 
promulgate their anti-harassment policies and procedures, and 
make efforts to encourage employees to use these procedures 
instead of submitting themselves sexually to supervisors. 
Adopting customized reasonable-woman standards would un-
dermine the positive effects of the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology. 
The Ninth Circuit's suggestion that it might consider the 
legal effects of a plaintiffs emotional and financial difficulties 
in deciding implicit threat sexual harassment cases raises a 
number of troubling issues.205 Creating a more subjective stan-
dard leads to unjustifiable employer liability and unfairly de-
nies employers the ability to use the reasonable-care defense. 
Furthermore, custom-fit standards of reasonableness would 
http://www.contracostatimes.comlmldlcctimeslbusinessl7998950.htm (last accessed on 
Mar. 13, 2004). 
202 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
203 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that co-
erced submission is a tangible employment action). 
204 But see Maria Greco Danahar, Relationships Between Supervisors And Subor-
dinates May Lead To Legal Liability, 5 No. 19 LAWYERS J.6 (2003). This article re-
views the Ninth Circuit's decision in Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F3d. 1158 and 
then warns employers that they must acknowledge that supervisor-subordinate dating 
can lead to liability for sexual harassment. While this article does not directly encour-
age the use of anti-fraternization policies, it suggests that the Holly D. decision has 
incited fear in the employers' bar. This fear may encourage employers to take drastic 
measures, such as anti-fraternization policies, instead of more meaningful ones such as 
encouraging employees to use the complaint procedures. 
205 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) (sug-
gesting that emotional and financial disabilities might be incorporated into the reason-
able woman standard). 
31
Jarratt: The Reasonable-Woman Standard
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
158 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
result in unequal treatment of women in the workplace and 
would quash workplace romance. To avoid the ramifications of 
tailoring the reasonable-woman standard to fit individual 
plaintiffs with certain disabilities, the Ninth Circuit should 
maintain the objective reasonable-woman standard. 
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